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The Hopeless Dream of Being

In its extensive play with character and form, Bergman’s
Persona becomes as difficult to analyze as an actual patient. Susan
Sontag talks about how the viewer can only move toward but never
achieve certainty about the action (129). Simply, it is about two
women whose conflicting desires lead them to spend a cathartic
summer at a seaside cottage. Critic John Simon describes the movie
as a meditation on the numbers 1 and 2: it is about one splitting in
two and two becoming one (216). The film is constantly attempting
to balance, or at least justify, the existence of the disparities and
paradoxes of life, many of which become embodied in Elisabet
and Alma. Many critics have written on the opposing duality of
female spectatorship, and I would argue that by reading the two
women as active and passive gazes we can unlock the riddle of
Ingmar Bergman’s poetic film.
The first question is: what, really, is wrong with Elisabet?
She seems very healthy but for her silence, which, as Alma
immediately notes, seems self-controlled. Even when the two
women reach the cottage by the sea she remains absolutely silent,
though in a letter home she says that her soul is seeming to smooth
over. John Simon notes that a clue is given in the title. In Latin,
“Persona” literally means mask. This is interesting enough, but
Simon traces the roots of the word further. While Persona was
being made, Ingmar Bergman was reading Carl Jung, who defines
“Persona” as the role a that someone plays for the benefit of others,
as well as to satisfy their own expectations of self (Simon 224).
So when Elisabet suddenly stops on stage, with the urge to laugh
followed by a plunge into silence, it seems that she suddenly realizes
what Shakespeare means when he writes, “all the world’s a stage.” I

can see why she would laugh; she is doing the deed. While on stage
she realizes that every action, whether in life or theater, is an act;
there is a painful irony in the uniform dishonesty of everything.
Alma and Elisabet both return to the mirror stage of their
development at the summer cottage. This is a pre-lingual stage
that begins as a child first recognizes him or herself in the mirror,
typically sometime between 6 and 18 months (Lacan 2). This
recognition is our first sense of self. We realize that the reflection
is us; we say, “That is me.” Even more than this, we perceive the
reflection as something that we should be. The reflective gestalt
is inevitably separate, causing a personal anxiety that we do not
measure up to what we are supposed to be (Lacan 4). As we grow
older, the mirror stage continues and expands beyond our own
reflection, or, rather, it expands to include those in whom we find a
reflection of ourselves. Cinema provides this reflection as much as,
if not more than, any other experience.
In Persona, for example, Alma tells Elisabet that, when
she left the actress’ last film she was struck by how similar they
looked and even thought that she, too, could be like Elisabet if
she tried. But, she concedes that she is not as pretty as Elisabet is
and admits that she is too lazy to change. It is interesting to note
Elisabet’s similarity to the cinema screen. She is, after all, one of
its stars, and the first time we see her she is in makeup on stage.
Plus, like the screen, she is silent and unresponding. This vacancy
allows the pent up Alma to speak to her as an analysand would
to their psychoanalyst (Renn). In Elisabet, Alma experiences a
multidimensional effect of the cinema in her waking life. Critic
Laura Mulvey explains how Lacan’s mirror stage is satisfied in
voyeuristic gaze, for when we project ourselves onto the silent
screen our repressed desires emerge (2). And as the movie unfolds,
this is precisely what happens.
Elisabet has almost completely returned to the mirror stage.
She has reverted to a time before speech; she is only receptive and
gives no output. When we first see her in the hospital, she is nearly
vacant, and we do not see her show any emotion until, in her room
at night, she reacts with terror to footage of Thich Quang Duc’s
self immolation. Since Elisabet has returned to the mirror stage,
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she is terrified as she relates to Thich Quang Duc. As someone
rebelling silently, she is struck at the possible outcome of a refusal
to comply. Elisabet no longer acknowledges any defining traits
and does not seem to want to speak to or of her family. To quote
Mulvey again, “the sense of forgetting the world as the ego has
subsequently come to perceive it (I forgot who I am and where I
was) is nostalgically reminiscent of the” mirror stage (3). In a way,
the two women have joined us as members of the audience, by
which I mean that they, too, can be psychologically affected by the
film.
It is hard to say what exactly the two women represent.
Consensus always defines them as opposites: as two sides of the
same woman (which seems, to me, a little too much like a kitschy
psychological thriller), as analyst and patient (Renn) or as corrupted
action and “ingenious soul” (Sontag 136). The most enlightening
idea, which is mentioned in many places including Sontag’s essay,
interviews with the actresses, and most notably in John Simon’s
essay on the film, relies on August Strindberg’s play The Stronger,
which features two characters, one silent and one talkative (Simon
299). There are many readings that this play can contribute to the
film, but for this essay I will focus on the difference between the
passive, or silent, character and the active, speaking, character.
The passive/active binary is one of seemingly endless
disparities that the film confronts in Alma and Elisabet’s
distant statues. They are such opposites that any duality can be
represented in their arguments. It is important to note, again,
Simon’s comment that Persona is about one splitting into two and
two becoming one (216). Simon cites Susan Sontag’s essay on
the film where she says we are watching the story of two women
but also the two sides of a single woman: the aforementioned
corrupted action and ingenious soul, who flounders in contact with
the corrupted action (136).1 Alma and Elisabet are two different
women, this is certain, but they do literally become one in the
famous shot of their faces in amalgam. The double-function is
disconcerting and it is one of the ways in which the film finds its
sublimity. For, in the summer cottage by the sea we find ourselves,
1. This is eerily similar to Lacan’s definition of the mirror stage in dreams, which
I have included in the next footnote.
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with the women, attempting to balance or marry the paradoxes
that we find in every hollow of our inter- and intrapersonal
relationships.
In film terms, this binary can be shown by the two opposite
views of the female gaze in film as explored Laura Mulvey and
Mary Ann Doane. The two women have reverted to the mirror
stage, making the cinematic gaze function within the film as well as
for those watching it.2 Both writers are concerned with female gaze
in patriarchal cinema, where women are always objects of desire.
Even in Persona, a film with only two characters, both women,
there is a patriarchal order. We see this effect on Alma manifested
in her energies. Alma’s main focuses are her confusion and ennui.
These come from her relationships with men: first in the five year
affair with the married man and after in her engagement to Karl
Heinrick. Elisabet, on the other hand, does now show Alma’s
energy, as she is the object. Elisabet is both the object of desire that
cinema so often portrays and simultaneously a mother. Doane is
working off of Mulvey, who says the female gaze can function in
two ways: the passive, or masochistic, and the active, or masculine,
gazes (Doane 24). As Persona is working with the character divisions
that Strindberg creates in The Stronger, there is a direct link to these
roles, which are already fairly obvious. To be clear, Alma, the
speaker, is the active character and the silent Elisabet is passive.
To explore this a little, let’s bring the active and
passive gazes to the original level of psychoanalysis. The three
psychoanalytic critics that I have mentioned are each adding onto
the work of the critic that came before them; Doane is responding
to Mulvey who is responding to Lacan. In his discussion of the

2. I find it interesting here to add a note on the setting. Lacan says that the
mirror stage is represented in dreams by a castle which is “surrounded by
marshes and rubbish-tips, dividing it into two opposed fields of contest where
the subject flounders in quest of the lofty, remote inner castle whose form
(sometimes juxtaposed in the same scenario) symbolizes the id in a quite startling
way” (5). The summer cottage can easily be compared to this dream castle, as
the sometimes marshy, always natural setting establishes the wild juxtaposition.
Then, there is a beautiful shot of Bibi Andersonn right after Alma reads
Elisabet’s letter where she is standing on the edge of a marshy pond looking at
her reflection, and we can see her body full above the pond and below in the
reflection.
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mirror stage, Lacan marks the opposition between what he calls
narcissistic libido, which is a function of the pre-Oedipal gaze,
and the sexual libido, which develops as humans move into the
Oedipal stage (Lacan 6). I would argue that, as adults, when we
watch a movie and return to the mirror stage we do not forget our
learned sexual preferences as we have irrevocably passed through
the Oedipal stage. I would align the activity of Alma’s gaze with
the sexual libido. We see this throughout the film as her problems
seem all to be tied to sex: She is controlled by her relationships
with men and deals explicitly with her sexual desire when she is in
the cottage. This comes in three forms: memory, subversion, and
action. Memory is the driving force during the intense scene in
which she recounts her beach orgy. Sexual subversion drives Alma’s
infatuation with Elisabet, and the subsequent action when she goes
to bed with Herr Volger during the dream-like middle section of
the film. Inversely, Elisabet’s return to the mirror stage is more
complete; it functions on a narcissistic libido as we see in her refusal
to speak and in her absorption in images on the television and the
photographs of her son and the Jewish Diaspora.
Laura Mulvey goes further into the structures of looking
specifically as they apply to women. The active gaze (of Alma),
which Mulvey calls Scopophilic, recognizes itself as a separate
being from the object of its desire in order to view the object
erotically (3). Here, again, I will point to Alma’s direct reference
to Elisabet’s film, but this time I want to point out the way she
signifies difference, saying that Elisabet is much prettier. This
happens more directly later in the film when the women begin
merging and Alma repeatedly shouts, “I am not Elisabet Volger!”
This gaze, Mulvey notes, aligns the female spectator with the male
viewer in that they both desire to own the beauty on stage. She
notes that once this desire is fulfilled, the glamour of the beauty
fades. In Persona this also happens directly. We first see Elisabet on
stage, lit and with makeup on, but then Alma is given custody of
her and she looks sickly without her makeup and stage demeanor.
As with Lacan, Elisabet represents the Narcissistic gaze of a
woman, which Mulvey defines as the identification of the ego with
the object of desire (3). For Elisabet this is easy because she is an

actress; she is that staged object of desire. This seems too easy.
We have to ask, what is it that Elisabet desires? This question is
difficult because, as a staged female there seems no other object
of desire. As a female, Freudian psychoanalysis would say that her
desire is located within her lack of a phallus. Then, Mulvey quotes
Freud, who believed that the binary at the basis of this formulation,
the sexual and narcissistic libidos, were always overlaying and
interacting. These two contradictory forces, she says, have found
their place in the cinema which has “evolved a particular illusion
of reality in which this contradiction between libido and ego has
found a beautifully complimentary fantasy world” (3). This sounds
like it was written about Persona. I think one of the most beautiful
scenes in the film touches on this coexistence. The two women
return from mushrooming and sit at a porch table and hum a duet,
each part responding and adding to the other to form one piece of
music.
Doane, the latest critic of the group, helps to answer
some questions that have so far been left unanswered. Perhaps
the added effect that Doane’s article has comes from its inclusion
of Metz’s idea about the distance between the voyeur and the
object (23). This is something that Mulvey approaches when she
is talking about how the active gaze keeps its object at an erotic
distance, but she leaves it at that. Doane compares this look to the
threat of castration which a boy faces in the Oedipal stage, so it
is “in the distance between the look and the threat that the boy’s
relation to knowledge of sexual difference is formulated” (23). In
Persona I think this applies mostly to the young boy we see in the
prologue and epilogue to the film, but the meaning of this quote
has to be changed for the cinema, or at least reevaluated into
Metz’s definition. The cinema space would be between the viewer
and the screen, and it would be here that sexual development is
placed. In the case of the boy, we see him reaching for the shifting
faces of the shrouded women. John Simon believes that this boy is
Bergman, and he describes the distance into which he is reaching
as the “evanescent frontier between reality and dream” (239). The
shrouded, shifting women, then, are different aspects of the desired
mother. This point is supported by the repeated use of the shroud
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in the film. Whenever the shroud appears it is always framing the
mother: Elisabet.
As the application of Mulvey ends we are left with a scant
understanding of Elisabet’s passive gaze. We can take the theories
so far as to say that she is attempting to resolve her lack, but this
only leads us to ask the same questions that someone would ask
at the beginning of a discussion of Persona. For instance, why is
Elisabet quiet, or, a little bit more refined, how does she attempt
to nullify this lack? Her career has not paid off what she thought it
would. Her desires are as strong as ever. She is thrown off when a
friend mentions her lack at a party, saying that she has everything,
the career and marriage, but she lacks motherliness. This sends
Elisabet down a new path to negate the lack; Doane calls this
action the masquerade. The masquerade is a guise of exaggerated
femininity that attempts to nullify the lack by increasing the gap
between the looker and the object (Doane 26). Again, I want to call
the Jungian definition of “Persona” to mind, as it is tied to the idea
of a masquerade. It is the social role that each of us plays.
In the end, the problem for both women, both binaries of
the female gaze or whatever duality we want to tie to them, is the
ineffectivity of their work. Both women are trying to conquer their
lack, but to no avail. John Simon notes that “the two opposites,
theatre and life, have become one in their joint untruthfulness”
(265). Persona says it even more succinctly in Elisabet’s note to the
nurse in which she summarizes some of Alma’s near-incoherent
chatter from the night before: She claims her perceptions do not
match up with her actions. Neither Elisabet nor Alma can make
sense of their own actions. Alma begins her first monologue by
noting that we can do whatever we want, but then talks about the
life that she is predestined to live with her fiancée Karl Heinrich.
She says that it is nothing to think about, that this future is inside
her. In Alma and Elisabet’s relationship we see two oppositions
affecting each other, sometimes well and sometimes destructively.
At the end of the film, things have returned to normal.
We see Bergman shooting a film with Elisabet and Alma gets on
the bus going back, we assume, to everyday life. Nothing seems to
have changed, but both women say that they learned a lot during

their stay at the cabin. There is at least sufficient change to make
Elisabet work and speak again. Elisabet and Alma must have come
to accept their Persona; they have learned that these masks are
not something that we can escape. Can truth manifest in social
interaction? This we still do not know, but the women realize that
we give of our personal honesty as a sacrifice for our interactions
with others. Our perception of a person will never match their
conception of themselves. What Susan Sontag says of the film
can be said of people, we can only move toward one another but
never achieve certainty. As Sontag says, everything at the end of
the film remains divided, though it is vampiristically intertwined
(145). We have to remember that the first thing we see the boy in
the prologue reach for, the frontier between reality and dream, is
the audience. So the boy, Bergman, reaches out for life, sets reality
as his ultimate desire. Persona is a powerful film because it shows us
our innate desire for reality and life and at the end it sacrifices itself
and falls off of the reels.
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in the film. Whenever the shroud appears it is always framing the
mother: Elisabet.
As the application of Mulvey ends we are left with a scant
understanding of Elisabet’s passive gaze. We can take the theories
so far as to say that she is attempting to resolve her lack, but this
only leads us to ask the same questions that someone would ask
at the beginning of a discussion of Persona. For instance, why is
Elisabet quiet, or, a little bit more refined, how does she attempt
to nullify this lack? Her career has not paid off what she thought it
would. Her desires are as strong as ever. She is thrown off when a
friend mentions her lack at a party, saying that she has everything,
the career and marriage, but she lacks motherliness. This sends
Elisabet down a new path to negate the lack; Doane calls this
action the masquerade. The masquerade is a guise of exaggerated
femininity that attempts to nullify the lack by increasing the gap
between the looker and the object (Doane 26). Again, I want to call
the Jungian definition of “Persona” to mind, as it is tied to the idea
of a masquerade. It is the social role that each of us plays.
In the end, the problem for both women, both binaries of
the female gaze or whatever duality we want to tie to them, is the
ineffectivity of their work. Both women are trying to conquer their
lack, but to no avail. John Simon notes that “the two opposites,
theatre and life, have become one in their joint untruthfulness”
(265). Persona says it even more succinctly in Elisabet’s note to the
nurse in which she summarizes some of Alma’s near-incoherent
chatter from the night before: She claims her perceptions do not
match up with her actions. Neither Elisabet nor Alma can make
sense of their own actions. Alma begins her first monologue by
noting that we can do whatever we want, but then talks about the
life that she is predestined to live with her fiancée Karl Heinrich.
She says that it is nothing to think about, that this future is inside
her. In Alma and Elisabet’s relationship we see two oppositions
affecting each other, sometimes well and sometimes destructively.
At the end of the film, things have returned to normal.
We see Bergman shooting a film with Elisabet and Alma gets on
the bus going back, we assume, to everyday life. Nothing seems to
have changed, but both women say that they learned a lot during

their stay at the cabin. There is at least sufficient change to make
Elisabet work and speak again. Elisabet and Alma must have come
to accept their Persona; they have learned that these masks are
not something that we can escape. Can truth manifest in social
interaction? This we still do not know, but the women realize that
we give of our personal honesty as a sacrifice for our interactions
with others. Our perception of a person will never match their
conception of themselves. What Susan Sontag says of the film
can be said of people, we can only move toward one another but
never achieve certainty. As Sontag says, everything at the end of
the film remains divided, though it is vampiristically intertwined
(145). We have to remember that the first thing we see the boy in
the prologue reach for, the frontier between reality and dream, is
the audience. So the boy, Bergman, reaches out for life, sets reality
as his ultimate desire. Persona is a powerful film because it shows us
our innate desire for reality and life and at the end it sacrifices itself
and falls off of the reels.
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